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FIDUCIARIES: WHEN IS SELF-DENIAL OBLIGATORY?
SARAH WORTHINGTON*
A highly paid agent sets out to undermine his principal’s business. A doc-
tor wangles sex-for-drugs favours from a patient. An advisor offers self-
interested advice to his client. A father engages in an incestuous relation-
ship with his child. In each case the perpetrator is clearly a wrongdoer and
the law must somehow respond. But what is the legal wrong and how
should the law respond?
The thesis advanced here is that it is too easy—and is ultimately unsat-
isfactory—to meet any justifiable moral outrage simply by tagging these
people as fiduciaries and then applying against them the full remedial force
of fiduciary law.1 If the law is to be applied consistently, predictably and
efficiently, then categorisation of fact situations as illustrating particular
wrongs and as meriting particular remedies must be more discriminating.
There are real choices to be made in deciding how to develop this area of
the law, choices which can be seen in operation in different forms in dif-
ferent Commonwealth jurisdictions. Albeit only in outline form, this arti-
cle puts the case for a very tightly defined notion of fiduciary obligation
and an equally restrictive view of the appropriate remedial response. It
points to several issues which appear to work against precision in fiducia-
ry law, and advocates a strict response. It concludes by attempting to pin-
point what appears to be critical in identifying fiduciaries.2
I. PRECISION IN LEGAL CLASSIFICATION AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
The drive for better remedies provides much of the modern impetus for a
loose—and purely instrumental—use of the fiduciary tag. The primary
objective in attaching a fiduciary label is often to obtain the advantages of
a proprietary claim (via a constructive trust);3 other incentives include the
500
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*London School of Economics and Political Science.
1 As various judges have: see USSC v. Hospital Products International Ltd. [1982] 2 N.S.W.R. 766,
rev’d (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41; Norberg v. Wynrib (1992) 92 D.L.R. (4th) 449; Hodgkinson v. Simms
(1994) 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161; M (K) v. M (H) (1992) 96 D.L.R. (4th) 289.
2 Much has been written on fiduciaries. See especially A. Scott (1949) 37 Cal. L.R. 539; L.S. Sealy
[1962] C.L.J. 69; J.C. Shephered (1981) 97 L.Q.R. 51; T. Frankel (1983) 71 Cal. L.R. 795; P.D. Finn,
‘The Fiduciary Principle” in T. G. Youdan (ed.), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto 1989), ch. 1;
R. Flannigan (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 285; Hon. J. R. M. Gautreau (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
3 E.g. Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. [1995] 1 A.C. 74, Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd. (in admin. rec.) [1994]
1 W.L.R. 1181, and Daly v. Sydney Stock Exchange (1986) 160 C.L.R. 371, all cases where the pro-
prietary claim failed.
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avoidance of restrictive limitation periods4 and (more questionably) the
avoidance of contractual rules on remoteness of damage.5 The expansion
necessarily inherent in this drive for better remedies does little to enhance
the doctrinal purity of fiduciary law. One response to this is to concede the
logical flaws in adopting a purely instrumental fiduciary tag, but to claim
the desired remedies anyway by rejecting the notion of a necessary link
between the fiduciary tag and any particular remedy. This approach
assumes that the common law simply provides a vast remedial menu from
which it is possible to select the most appropriate response to any given set
of facts.6
However, common sense suggests that no legal system can survive, as
a system, on such a footing. Before long generalised rules must develop
indicating which behaviours will be punished and what form the punish-
ment will take. Moreover, every jurisprudential theory recognises the inti-
mate link between rights and remedies: if a remedy is altered, then the
right, too, is changed. If currently-styled “fiduciary remedies” were made
available for some (or all) non-fiduciary wrongs, then of necessity this
means that the underpinning right has metamorphosed. Taken to extremes,
such a meta-fiduciary law has the potential to swallow whole much of con-
tract and tort law.7 However, this could happen only if the legal system
restyled contract and tort obligations to focus on prophylactically ensuring
the affirmative advancement of plaintiffs’ interests, rather than simply
ensuring their protection from harm. Such a transition is not impossible,
but it goes far beyond what is commonly intended by the advocates of a
liberal use of the common law’s “remedial menu”.
In short, a legal system entails that rights and remedies can be subject-
ed to some form of classification: rights only mean something in terms of
the remedies they attract.8 The difficulties in defining that system, includ-
ing fiduciary obligations and their associated remedies, cannot be evaded
by claiming the remedies where the rights do not exist.
II. PRECISION IN “FIDUCIARY” TERMINOLOGY
Loose terminology is a further cause of imprecision in fiduciary law. At its
worst, it engenders the assumption that any breach of obligation by a
C.L.J Fiduciaries and Self-Denial 501
4 E.g. Nocton v. Lord Ashburton [1914] A.C. 932.
5 E.g. Hodgkinson v. Simms (1994) 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
6 E.g. Aquaculture Corp. v. New Zealand Green Mussel Co. Ltd. [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R. 299, 301; Butler v.
Countrywide Finance Ltd. [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 623, 631 per Hammond J. For criticism, see the refer-
ences cited in J. Geltzer, “Patterns of Fusion” in P. Birks (ed.), The Classification of Obligations
(Oxford 1997) (“Classification”) ch. 7, at p. 160 n. 14. But also see E.J. Weinrib, “The Juridical
Classification of Obligations” ibid., at ch. 2, pp. 48–51, advocating a different and more limited ver-
sion of the “remedial menu”, justified simply on the basis of corrective justice.
7 J.D. McCamus (1997) 28 Can. Bus. L.J. 107, 115.
8 See J. Stapleton, “A New ‘Seascape’ for Obligations: Reclassification on the Basis of Measure of
Damages’ in Classification (n. 6 above), ch. 8.
chp-2  11/26/99  4:03 PM  Page 501
fiduciary (whether a common law or an equitable obligation) is a breach of
fiduciary obligation. The carelessly accepted inference is then that prefer-
ential (“fiduciary”) remedies are available. At least where the common law
is concerned, such loose usage is now explicitly decried:9 a negligent fidu-
ciary commits a tort, not a breach of fiduciary obligation;10 fraud, even
when committed by a trustee, is a tort, not a breach of trust;11 an obligation
to perform a contractual undertaking honestly and conscientiously does not
imply that the obligation is fiduciary;12 finally, an obligation to make resti-
tution is not fiduciary.13
The related recognition that not all breaches of equitable obligations are
breaches of fiduciary obligation seems later in coming. True, such termi-
nology is a matter of choice; but the underlying distinctions need explicit
recognition. The term “fiduciary” could be used quite generally to refer to
all persons subjected to equitable obligations.14 But then separate terms
would be needed to differentiate between individuals subjected to some but
not all of the different equitable (“fiduciary”) obligations. It seems prefer-
able to adopt a much narrower usage. The term “fiduciary” could be con-
fined to those individuals who are subjected to obligations of loyalty (ie
obligations of self-denial). The advantage of such restricted usage is that a
concise tag conveys a precise meaning. Certainly, and perhaps for this rea-
son, such usage appears to be gaining hold.15 Adopting this usage, a breach
of confidence is not a breach of fiduciary obligation,16 nor is a failure to act
in good faith in the interests of the beneficiary and for proper purposes17—
502 The Cambridge Law Journal [1999]
9 See the cases cited in the footnotes immediately following, and also Clark Boyce v. Mouat [1994] 1
A.C. 428, 437 per Lord Jauncey; NZ Netherland Soc. v. Kuys [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1126, 1130 per Lord
Wilberforce; Permanent BS v. Wheeler (1994) 14 A.C.S.R. 109, 157 per Ipp J.; Breen v. Williams
(1996) 70 A.L.J.R. 772, 807.
10 See Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761, 799 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson;
White v. Jones [1995] 2 W.L.R. 187, 209–210 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Bristol & West BS v.
Mothew [1996] 4 All E.R. 698, 710, 712 per Millett L.J. (although referring to an equitable duty of
care); Girardet v. Crease & Co. (1987) 11 B.C.L.R. (2d) 361, 362 per Southin J.; LAC Minerals Ltd.
v. International Corona Resources Ltd. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 647 per La Forest J.
and 597–598 per Sopinka J.
11 Paragon Finance plc v. Thakerar & Co. (a firm) [1999] 1 All E.R. 40 (CA).
12 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. [1994] 2 All E.R. 806, 821 per Lord Mustill.
13 The cases do not seem to have gone so far yet, but see Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd. v.
Maxwell (No. 2) [1994] 1 All E.R. 261; Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns [1997] 1 A.C. 421, 432–439
per Lord Browne-Wilkinson (although counsel conceded a breach of fiduciary duty). Also see D.
Hayton, “Fiduciaries in Context: An Overview” in P. Birks (ed.), Privacy and Loyalty (Oxford 1997)
(“Privacy”), ch. 11, at pp. 286–290; J. Heydon (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 334.
14 This is how the term is used in P.D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney 1977), see p. 2.
15 See Bristol & West BS v. Mothew [1996] 4 All E.R. 698, 710, 712 per Millett L.J; Breen v. Williams
(1996) 70 A.L.J.R. 772, 793–799 per Gaudron and McHugh JJ., 782 per Dawson and Toohey JJ., 808
per Gummow J.; Warman v. Dwyer (1994) 182 C.L.R. 544. Also see D. Hayton, (n. 13 above); R. P.
Austin, “Moulding the Content of Fiduciary Duties” in A. J. Oakley (ed.), Trends in Contemporary
Trust Law (Oxford 1996) ch. 7, pp. 156–159; P. D. Finn, (n. 2 above).
16 Indata Equipment Supplies Ltd. (trading as Autofleet) v. ACL Ltd. Times, 14 August 1997.
17 Breen v. Williams (1996) 70 A.L.J.R. 772, 793–799 per Gaudron and McHugh JJ.; Sidaway v.
Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] A.C. 871, 884 per Lord Scarman, and [1984] 1 All E.R.
1019, 1032 per Browne-Wilkinson L.J.
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although both are breaches of equitable obligations.18 To say that individ-
uals occupying certain posts are often subject to all three forms of equi-
table obligation—fiduciary obligations, obligations of confidence and
obligations of good faith and proper purposes—is no more significant than
to say that the same individuals are often also subject to obligations in con-
tract, tort and unjust enrichment.
In short, fiduciary terminology should be used carefully and restrictive-
ly, so that fiduciary law operates only to exact loyalty; it does not concern
itself with matters of contract, tort, unjust enrichment and other equitable
obligations (such as breach of confidence).19
III. RATIONALISING THE LAW/EQUITY DIVIDE
A further concern to modern fiduciary law is the relevance and significance
of the traditional law/equity divide. One suggestion for avoiding the diffi-
culties in defining fiduciaries is to subsume equitable (including fiduciary)
obligations under the common law umbrella of contract, tort and unjust
enrichment. Common sense suggests that “the law” must respond to injus-
tices, and that its response ought to be right the first time: there should be
no place for an initial “common law” response subsequently overridden by
a different “equitable” one. The history of the law’s evolution—and the
fact that certain developments took place in physically distinct courts—
should not be allowed to overshadow the truth that the whole process, in
all the courts and legislatures, has been a movement towards further refine-
ment and sophistication of the legal system. It ought by now to be possible
to see the law as it is, in its entirety, without the need to rehearse the saga
of its development. Certain contracts are simply specifically enforceable;
there should be no need to add, each time, the historical truth that initially
the common law would only award damages, but that subsequently equity
allowed orders for specific performance. Similarly with contracts which
are subject to rescission for mistake or misrepresentation.
Even accepting this, it remains true that fiduciary law—and the law
relating to other equitable obligations—demands separate treatment. It is
not simply an evolutionary and sophisticated gloss on the common law of
C.L.J Fiduciaries and Self-Denial 503
18 See Hodgkinson v. Simms [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 411–412 per La Forest J., pp. 464, 466 per Sopinka and
McLachlin JJ. (diss.). In this context, a further comment on categorisation is warranted. The doctrine
of undue influence (albeit an equitable doctrine discussed at length in texts on equity) is completely
independent of and distinct from the various equitable obligations, including fiduciary obligations,
being considered here. Undue influence concerns the sufficiency of consent; it enables a transaction
(whether by gift or contract) to be set aside: in short, it is a doctrine relevant to the law of unjust enrich-
ment. See D. Hayton, (n. 13 above), at p. 286. But see CIBC Mortgages plc v. Pitt [1993] 4 All E.R.
433, 439–440 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, querying the difference, if any, between fiduciary obliga-
tion and presumed undue influence. Also see P. D. Finn, (n. 14 above), at ch. 16, and L. S. Sealy [1962]
C.L.J. 69, 79, where undue influence is discussed in the context of fiduciary obligations.
19 P.D. Finn, (n. 2 above), at p. 28.
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contract, tort or unjust enrichment.20 Fiduciary obligations cannot be
classed as a sub-category of contract: they do not arise by process of offer
and acceptance supported by consideration; the remedies for their breach
are not aimed at placing the victim, so far as money can do it, in some pre-
agreed anticipated position. Nor are these obligations a sub-category of
tort. Like tort (and unjust enrichment), they are obligations imposed by
operation of law rather than by agreement, but there the similarities end.
The policy imperatives which underpin fiduciary obligations are quite dif-
ferent from those underpinning tort, and neither mirror those underpinning
unjust enrichment. These differences have ensured that the remedial conse-
quences for all three remain appropriately distinct. It follows that the three
should necessarily be seen as different and distinct subdivisions of the law.
If these differences are conceded, then it might be possible to eliminate
the distracting “equitable” tag by siting all the conventional “equitable”
obligations under the umbrella term of “obligations of good faith and loy-
alty”. The class would include fiduciary obligations, obligations of confi-
dence, and duties to act bona fide and for proper purposes. This distinct
class would permit formal recognition of the significant divisions between
contract, tort, unjust enrichment and “obligations of good faith and loyal-
ty”, but would consign to legal history the chronology and place of the var-
ious developments. A side-benefit of this different labelling might be to
deny the option for surreptitious or selective law reform—of either reme-
dies or obligations themselves—by the simple device of attaching an
“equitable” tag to a defendant.
IV. RATIONALISING THE INCIDENCE OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
Even if it is conceded that fiduciary obligations are obligations of loyalty
imposed by law rather than by agreement21 and contained within a wider
category of obligations of good faith and loyalty, the central issue remains:
when will such obligations be imposed? The issue has inspired numerous
academic writers, many reciting theories too well-known to need rehears-
ing here. Also too well-known is the disappointing fact that none so far has
satisfactorily defined the circumstances which give rise to the obligation.
Commentators have tended to focus on relationship descriptors, assum-
ing that when similarly styled relationships arise one party will be bound
by fiduciary obligations.22 Mason J. in Hospital Products v. United States
504 The Cambridge Law Journal [1999]
20 See J. Geltzer, (n. 6 above), at pp. 166–167 and the references cited.
21 P.D. Finn, (n. 2 above), at p. 54. “Imposing” these obligations remains controversial: see L. Smith
(1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 714, 717: a person “cannot become a fiduciary unless he or she wills it”; also
see L. Hoyano, “The Flight to the Fiduciary Haven” in Privacy (n. 13 above), ch. 8 at pp. 182–183,
asserting that fiduciary relationships outside the traditional categories require an express or implied
undertaking to act solely in the interests of another, an undertaking which parallels the assumption of
responsibility doctrine in tort.
22 The most popular theories are examined in J. C. Shepherd (1981) 97 L.Q.R. 51.
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Surgical Corporation23 isolated what are frequently seen as the central
ideas underpinning fiduciary relationships:
The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary under-
takes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another
person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the
interests of that person in a legal or a practical sense. The relationship
between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a spe-
cial opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of
that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fidu-
ciary of his position. The expressions “for”, “on behalf of” and “in the
interests of” signify that the fiduciary acts in a “representative” char-
acter in the exercise of his responsibilities.24
This quotation earmarks the characteristics commonly asserted to be criti-
cal in determining the incidence of fiduciary obligations: one party entrusts
property to another; or undertakes to act in the interests of another; or relies
on another; or is vulnerable to abuse by another;25 or is able to exercise a
discretion affecting the other.26 But the difficulty has always been that
these descriptors, although apt to describe relationships where fiduciary
obligations are imposed, are often equally apt when such obligations are
absent.27 It follows that they cannot adequately and restrictively define the
incidence of fiduciary obligations.
Fewer commentators have focused on the social purpose of the fiduciary
obligation itself. This must surely be the starting point for any analysis of
the incidence of the obligation: legal “rules” must be linked to the particu-
lar social purpose for which they were devised,28 albeit the link may only be
apparent with hindsight. Fiduciary law originated in public policy.29 To that
extent it has parallels with negligence and, as with negligence, it can be
expected to adapt to reflect changing social standards. This is already
C.L.J Fiduciaries and Self-Denial 505
23 (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41.
24 Ibid., at pp. 96–97. Also see Lord Browne-Wilkinson in White v. Jones [1995] 2 A.C. 206, 271: “The
paradigm of the circumstances in which equity will find a fiduciary relationship is where one party, A,
has assumed to act in relation to the property or affairs of another, B”.
25 This idea is especially relied on in Canadian cases: see, e.g., LAC Minerals v. International Corona
Resources (1989) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 63 per Sopinka J.; Guerin v. R. (1984) 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321;
Frame v. Smith (1987) 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81, 98–99 per Wilson J., dissenting. This focus on vulnerabili-
ty has been criticised as evidencing a departure from the core fiduciary notion of the defendant’s self-
lessness: see L.S. Sealy (1995) 9 J.C.L. 37, 40.
26 See E. Weinrib (1975) U. Toronto L.J. 1, 7; Guerin v. R. (1984) 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 341 per
Dickson J.
27 For example, the characteristics are equally apt to describe the relationship between home-owner and
house-painter, diner and chef, driver and other road-users, all relationships accepted as adequately pro-
tected by contract and tort law. Also see Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. [1995] 1 A.C. 74, 98 per Lord
Mustill.
28 J. Hackney, “More than a trace of the old philosophy” in Classification (n. 6 above), ch. 6 at p. 126.
29 P. Finn, (n. 2 above), at p. 27. Also see Welles v. Middleton (1784) 1 Cox 112, 124–125, where fidu-
ciary status was justified as necessary “for the preservation of mankind.”
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evident in the incursions of fiduciary law into commerce,30 incursions justi-
fied by economic analysis.31
What is suggested here is that fiduciary obligations should be imposed
not simply when certain descriptors are apt, but when the very function or
purpose or reason for one party’s role in the relationship demands that the
party operate on the basis of self-denial. This condition is not met simply
because one party would prefer the other to act selflessly, or has assumed
this to be the case; nor is the condition denied simply because it is con-
ceivable that the subject’s interests can be served notwithstanding selfish
behaviour.32 All of our law is directed at protecting the interests of parties
to a relationship (consensual or otherwise). Imposition of an obligation of
self-denial affords ultimate protection, but it operates as a sledge-hammer:
it ought to be used only when absolutely necessary. Arguably it is needed
only if, without it, the subject would be left with no effective legal means
of monitoring the relationship; if, without it, obligations imposed in con-
tract or tort, or by a duty to act for proper purposes, would be insufficient
for the task. As a defining characteristic, this purpose-based requirement
appears very elastic. However, it ought to prove no more difficult to apply
than the search for implied terms in contract, or a duty of care in negligence.
This restrictive test for the imposition of fiduciary obligations is met by
what are currently styled the “status-based” fiduciary relationships—
trustee and beneficiary, director and company, partners, and certain agents
and their principals. It may be that outside these nominated categories there
is never, or rarely ever, a justification for imposing fiduciary obligations.
Certainly great care needs to be exercised in discriminating between these
relationships—which clearly demand the protection of fiduciary law—and
relationships where the protection afforded by tort and contract (including
recourse to equitable doctrines of misrepresentation, undue influence and
unconscionable bargains) fully meets the needs and purposes of the par-
ties’ engagement.33
Finally, none of this necessarily defines or limits the interests which
might be protected by a fiduciary obligation demanding loyalty or self-
denial. Clearly a subject’s economic interests fall most naturally to be pro-
tected: the central purpose of many relationships where fiduciary obliga-
tions are deemed appropriate is the protection or advancement of these
interests. It requires separate argument, however, to assert that fiduciary
obligations should be limited to protecting economic interests.
506 The Cambridge Law Journal [1999]
30 J. Glover, Commercial Equity—Fiduciary Relationships (Sydney 1995), at pp. 17–18.
31 G.K. Hadfield (1997) 28 Can. Bus. L.J. 141.
32 As in Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46.
33 Courts already concede that the finding of a fiduciary relationship between the parties must create
“obligations of a different character from those deriving from the contract itself” (Re Goldcorp
Exchange Ltd. [1995] 1 A.C. 74, 98). Also see L.S. Sealy (1995) 8 J.C.L. 142 and (1995) 9 J.C.L. 37,
nn. 56, 57.
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Nevertheless, this does seem to be the better view. Bodily integrity, priva-
cy, freedom of information, family and community values, and such like
appear to be inappropriate subjects for protection via an obligation of loy-
alty.34 If the law is inadequate in these different areas, then there should of
course be pressure for reform. However, fiduciary obligations ought not to
be used as a back-door route to law reform of private law obligations and
public law protections: this perpetrates in all its worst guises the common
law/equity divide discussed earlier.
V. REMEDIAL CONSTRAINTS
As noted earlier, part of the drive for a loose application of fiduciary prin-
ciples is the attraction of preferential remedies. But the reverse is also a
problem. Given an established fiduciary relationship, there is a growing
tendency to assert, or assume, that the remedial consequences are not lim-
ited to disgorgement of profits (either via personal accounting or a con-
structive trust, or by rescission of the impugned transaction), but include
damages or equitable compensation.35 When there has been a breach of
loyalty, the appropriate remedy, for very good reasons, is disgorgement.36
For reasons noted earlier, recourse to a wide common law “remedial
menu” is not advocated; it would fundamentally alter the rights being pro-
tected. If damages are desired, then a claim needs to be based on proof that
other obligations, directed at preservation from harm, have been
breached.37 Often this will not be difficult, but the technical exercise will
assist in preserving the structure and content of the rights in issue—or at
least in ensuring that any alteration is intentional.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions can be shortly stated. Fiduciary obligations are imposed
by private law, but their function is public and their purpose social.38
Accepting this, then although all human interaction cannot sensibly be
based on putting others’ interests first, some must. When self-denial is nec-
essary to achieve the purpose of a relationship, then, and only then, should
fiduciary obligations be imposed. In assessing this the focus is squarely
C.L.J Fiduciaries and Self-Denial 507
34 This appears to be accepted by English and Australian courts: see L. Hoyano, (n 21 above), at p. 173
and the references cited; D. Hayton, (n. 13 above), at pp. 291–292. But for the contrary approach, see,
e.g., Norberg v. Wynrib [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, 92 D.L.R. (4th) 229, 268–269 and 275 per McLachlin J.;
Frame v. Smith [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 143, 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81 per Wilson J.; M (K) v. M (H) (1992) 96
D.L.R. (4th) 289.
35 See J. D. McCamus (1997) 28 Can. Bus. L.J. 107, 112–113, 129–130.
36 See S. Worthington, “Reconsidering Disgorgement for Wrongs” (1999) 62 M.L.R. 218; and
“Remedying and Ratifying Directors’ Breaches” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. (forthcoming).
37 See J. Stapleton, (n. 8 above).
38 See L. Wedderburn (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 203, 221.
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on the role undertaken by the fiduciary, not on the individual personal
characteristics of either party. More often than not imposition of an oblig-
ation of self-denial is unwarranted: the parties’ interests are adequately
protected by obligations imposed in contract, tort, unjust enrichment and
so forth. All these bodies of law have been attenuated to meet the perceived
and growing needs of parties, and no doubt this development will contin-
ue. In those rare situations where an obligation of loyalty and self-denial is
necessary, its social significance is acknowledged by applying the punitive
and prophylactic remedy of disgorgement in cases of breach. In short, the
suggestion is that fiduciary law should not be the growing area that it is
sometimes alleged to be.39
508 The Cambridge Law Journal [1999]
39 See, e.g., T. Frankel, (n. 2 above), at p. 798, asserting that “society is evolving into one based pre-
dominantly on fiduciary relations.”
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